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CURRENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-AcTION FOR MARITIME TORT MAY BE BROUGHT AT COMMON
LAw.-While the plaintiff, a longshoreman, was working on board the defendant's
vessel in the North River, he was seriously injured by falling through a hatchway
which had been negligently left open by his foreman. The defendant had complied
with the provisions of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law (Laws, 1914,
ch. 4). The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the case on
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. Held, that there should be a new trial. Kennedy v. Cunard Co. (1921)
197 App. Div. 459, 189 N. Y. Supp. 402.
There can be no recovery for a maritime tort under a state workmen's compen-
sation statute. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct.
524; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (1920) 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct 438.
The plaintiff was remitted to the remedies he would have had if no compensation
act had existed, and one of those remedies was an action at common law in a
state court. For a comprehensive discussion of the problems of jurisdiction here
involved, see COMMENTS (1917-18) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 255, 924; (1919) 28
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 835; (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 925.
CONFLrCT OF LAWS-ENFORCEMENT OF FOEIGN JUDGMENTs.-The claimant
obtained a judgment in Malta against the estate of a testator, declaring that the
testator was the father of the claimant's illegitimate child, and ordering the
indefinite payment of an annuity to her out of his estate. In-the English adminis-
tration of the testator's estate the claimant sought to enforce payment of the
arrears. Held, that the claim should be denied (I) because it was based upon
facts which would give rise to no cause of action in England, being contrary to
public policy, and (2) because the judgment was not final, being subject to modifi-
cation according to the necessities of the child. Macfarlane v. Macartney [1921]
I Ch. 522.
The decision is in accord with the requisites of the English courts in the enforce-
ment of foreign judgments. See Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American Judg-
ments Abroad (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 268, 289. The American courts do
not look upon the rights of illegitimate children with such disfavor. See (1919)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 518. In this country, too, a judgment for alimony in
another state is final as to past installments actually due, and as such is entitled to
full faith and credit under the Federal Constitution. Sistare v. Sistare (igio)
218 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 682.
EvIbENcE-ADMissmnrrY OF SKULL OF DECEASED IN MURDER TRIAL.--The
defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree. At the trial, the skull
of the deceased, substantially in the same condition as when it was amputated from
the body, was admitted in evidence to furnish an ocular inspection to the jury of
the places of exit and entry of the bullet that produced death. The defendant
assigned its admission as error on the ground that it tended to improperly influence
the jury. Held, that there was no error in the admission of the skull as evidence.
Larmon v. State (I92I, Fla.) 88 So. 471.
The decision follows the rule applied in the great majority of American courts.
It is generally held that the skull of a deceased is admissible in evidence when it
furnishes an ocular demonstration to the jury, helpful to them in arriving at their
verdict. Thrawley v. State (1899) 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95; State v. Mariano
(1914) 37 R. I. 168,'gr At. 21; State v. Rodriguez (1917) 23 N. M. I56, 167
Pac. 426; Wharton, Criminal Evidence (IOth ed. 1912) sec. 518 C; 12 L. R. A.
[107]
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(N. S.) 238; see contra, Self v. State (1907) 90 Miss. 58, 43 So. 945 (almost
the only exception). In most instances objection is made, but there is no real
ground for apprehension. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (1904) sec. 1157.
JURY-WoMEN ELIGIBLE FOR JURY SERVICE-EFFECT OF NINETEENTH AMEND-
MENT.-The State appealed from a judgment of the court below quashing an
indictment for murder because one of the grand jury was a woman. A Pennsyl-
vania Statute (Pa. Sts. 192o, sec. 12861) required the selection of a jury from all
the qualified electors. Held, that the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution making women electors qualified them to act as jurors.
Commonwealth v. Maxwell (1921, Pa.) 114 AtI. 825.
At common law women were not eligible as jurors. 3 Blackstone, Cominen-
taries *362. Their present status as such is entirely statutory. The instant deci-
sion seems to assume that jury service is a privilege which accompanies that of
voting. See also People v. Barltz (1920) 212 Mich. 580, i8o N. W. 423. The
better view seems to be that jury service is a duty not attendant upon the privilege
of voting but imposed by specific legislative enactment. It has been so held in
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. In re Opinion of the Justices (1921,
Mass.) 13o N. E. 685; State v. James (1921, N. J.) 114 Atl. 553; In re Gilli
(1920, Sup. Ct) o Misc. 45, 179 N. Y. Supp. 795; see (i919) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 515.
STATUTES-VoID BECAUSE OF VAGUENEsS-EFFECT ON LEVER ACT OF PRE-
EXISTING CoNTRACT.-In September 1917 the defendant agreed to buy from the
plaintiff a quantity of oleum at $45.00 per ton, deliveries to be made over a period
extending somewhat beyond June, 1918. In June, the President of the United
States, acting under the authority apparently given him by certain sections of the
Lever Act of August 1o, 1917 (40 Stat. at L. 276, 277), fixed the maximum
price of oleum at $32.00 per ton. This act declared it to be unlawful "to make
any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any
necessaries," and authorized the President "to make such regulations .... as are
essential effectively to carry out the provisions of this act" Held, that the plaintiff
could recover, because (I) the act was too vague to impose any duty, and (2) it
could, in no event, apply to then existing contracts. Standard Chemical & Metals
Corp. v. Waigh Chemical Co. (1921) 231 N. Y. 51, 131 N. E. 566.
In dealing with criminal prosecutions under the Lever Act the Supreme Court
of the United States held that the prohibition quoted above was too vague to be
intelligible. Weeds v. United States (1921) 41 Sup. Ct 306. In the instant
case, the court, in holding this opinion applicable to a civil suit as well, said
(speaking through Cardozo, J.) : "A prohibition so indefinite as to be unintelli-
gible is not a prohibition by which conduct can be governed. It is not a rule at
all; it is merely exhortation and entreaty." And since the act was unintelligible in
its inception, the promulgation by the President of an order fixing prices was
unavailing, for there was nothing for him to put into effect. This holding seems
clearly sound and in accord with what little case law there is on the subject. 25
R. C. L. 8io.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAx-DEDUCTIBILITY OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAx.-The
Federal Estate Tax, Act of Sept. 8, 1916 (39 Stat. at L. 777), was assessed against
the estate of plaintiff's testator. The executors paid the tax, but claimed that
the amount should be deducted from the value of the estate in assessing the tax
under the provisions of the Rhode Island Inheritance Tax (Pub. Laws, i916, ch.
1339). The Board of Tax Commissioners disregarded this claim, and suit was
brought. Held, that the payment of the Federal Estate Tax could not be deducted
from the value of the estate in assessing the Rhode Island State Tax. Sweeney,
J., dissenting. Hazard v. Bliss (1921, R. I.) 113 At. 469.
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The case does not seem to be in accord with the general trend of authority in
other states. Corbin v. Baldwin (917) 92 Conn. 99, lOI At. 834; In re
Roebling's Estate (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 163, 104 AtI. 295; People v. Pasfield
(1918) 284 Ill. 450, 12o N. E. 286. In New York, however, the decisions are in
accord with the principal case. Matter of Sherman (1917) 179 App. Div. 497,
166 N. Y. Supp. 19. Pennsylvania has declared by statute that the Federal Estate
Tax is not a deduction. Laws, 1919, 521. The more general view that the
tax is deductible seems to be fairer; otherwise the legatee is forced to pay to the
state a tax on something which he never received. The varied results reached in
determining this question are to a large extent due to the different theories of
inheritance taxes which are involved. Gleason and Otis, Inheritance Taxation
(2d. ed. 1919) 383, 556; COMMENTS (I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1055. In
regard to the deductibility of the Federal Estate Tax and state inheritance taxes
in the assessment of the Federal Income Tax, see (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
199; (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 770.
TORTs-BAILMENTS-LABiLiTY OF BAILOR OF DEFECTIVE MACHINE TO THIRD
PARTY.-The defendant, an owner of a public garage, rented to a third party an
automobile, the steering apparatus of which was in a defective state of repair. As
a consequence the machine became unmanageable while being driven along the
public highway and ran into the plaintiff's automobile. The plaintiff brought suit
alleging that the defendant negligently rented the automobile knowing, or by the
exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have known, that it was in an
unsafe condition. The defendant demurred on the ground that the facts stated*
gave rise to no duty owing from the defendant to the plaintiff. Held, that, as
automobiles are in constant use on public highways, a garage-keeper, who lets them
for hire, owes a duty to the public to use ordinary care to see that the automobile
has its steering-gear in a reasonably safe condition. Collette v. Page (1921, R. I.)
114 Ati. 136.
The instant case seems to be in line with the recently developed tendency to
depart from the older view that liability in such cases extends only so far as privity
of contract can be found. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 N. Y.
382, III N. E. 105O. However, it assumes an aspect of originality in the applica-
tion of this development to the person of a bailor instead of a manufacturer. It
also follows a novel view that although an automobile is not prima facie an instru-
mentality dangerous per se, an automobile may be so out of repair as to fall within
that classification. Texas Co. v. Veloz (1913, Tex. Civ. App.) 162 S. W. 377.
But see Johnson v. Bullard Co. (192o) 95 Conn. 251, I1 Atl. 70 (holding that
actual knowledge of the defect is necessary to a recovery). For a discussion and
collection of the cases, see COMMENTS (ig2i) 30 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 607.
WILLs-FUTURE INTEREST-POSTPONEMENT OF POSSESSION OF ABSOLUTE
GIFr.-A legatee filed a bill asking that a provision in a will, postponing the dis-
tribution of vested gifts until after "the liquidation of the indebtedness" of a
certain corporation of which the testator was a principal stockholder, be declared
void, and that possession of the legacies be given immediately. Held, that the
provision postponing the possession of the gifts be disregarded. Canda v. Canda
(I92O, N. J. Eq.) 113 AtI. 503.
The decision rests on the ground that the contingency upon which possession of
the legacies was to be given was so uncertain as to be unreasonable. The court
seems to indicate that it favors the English rule, which holds that any direction
to withhold the possession and enjoyment of an absolute gift is void because
against public policy. Saunders v. Vantier (1841, Ch.) 4 Beav. 115. In the
United States the authorities are in conflict For a discussion supporting the view
that such provisions are valid, see COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 557.
